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Abstract
In today’s political conjuncture, Kant’s cosmopolitan thinking stands in some 
unique relation to his notion of the sublime. The present paper aims to articulate 
(i) how the Kantian sublime is re-appropriated in analyses of the mediated 
images of social disasters in this century, (ii) how a cosmopolitan thinking can 
be registered as an aesthetic experience which restores the lost moral dimension 
of the classical sublime and lastly (iii) what constitutes the nature of this new 
cosmopolitan structure that is temporary and different in its occurrence from 
what is suggested by many forms of new cosmopolitanism(s) in the discourse 
of social and political sciences. 
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Resumo
Na atual conjuntura política, o pensamento cosmopolita de Kant está em 
uma relação única com sua noção do sublime. O presente artigo tem por 
objetivo analisar (i) como o sublime Kantiano é reapropriada na análise das 
imagens mediadas de desastres sociais neste século, (ii) como um pensamento 
cosmopolita pode ser registrado como uma experiência estética que restaura 
a dimensão moral perdida do sublime clássico; (iii) qual seria a natureza dessa 
nova estrutura cosmopolita que é temporária e diferente em sua ocorrência 
do que é sugerido por muitas formas de cosmopolitismo(s) novo no discurso 
das ciências sociais e políticas.
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Introduction
In his philosophical system, Kant does not seek to establish a relationship 
between the disinterested aesthetic judgment and the impartial political judgment. 
Therefore, his aesthetics as it appears in the Critique of Judgment does not have 
any direct contact with his political approach represented best in his short political 
essays. This inclination was also reflected in Kantian scholarship until the late 1990s. 
In man’s endeavor to comprehend what happened during WWII, the 20th century 
mind detected a peculiar interaction between aesthetics and politics. The horrible 
images of the suffering caused by the war started endless discussions on the effects 
of mediation on human imagination. In the discussions, one particular philosopher 
and a specific kind of aesthetic judgment has become popular: Immanuel Kant and 
his theory of aesthetic judgment of the sublime. 
In the classical Kantian sense, the judgment of the sublime corresponds to 
a twofold feeling of both pain and pleasure which results from the inability of the 
imagination to estimate the size or the might of a natural grandeur. At first the 
subject feels pain because of this inconvenience of the imagination. However, rec-
ognizing the superiority of the human mind due to its moral capacity, in the end s/
he feels pleasure. For Kant, this bitter-sweet and essentially aesthetic experience is 
triggered merely by nature and it necessarily culminates in a celebration of human-
ity and rational capacities.
In the 20th century, however, the sublime feeling in its Kantian rendition 
has been used to redefine the feeling that results from the most immoral human 
acts. It has been re-appropriated in the context of two separate horrific acts of 
violence during WWII: the Holocaust and Hiroshima. The classical sublime is ap-
plied to indicate the shock of the human imagination in the face of unspeakable 
violent acts perpetrated by men. It addresses the unpresentable element inherent 
in these extreme cases of violence inflicted by humans. Therefore, the new face of 
the sublime evidently lacks the classical Kantian principle of pleasure. In this sense, 
the new sublime seems to be crippled and unfortunately it has been a theoretical 
frame to point out solely the shock/pain of human imagination in the encounter 
with unspeakable or unimaginable scenes of violence. 
In recent times, the concept of the sublime has been taken up again in analyses 
of some international terrorist incidents. The latest examples are the 11 September 
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. The Hollywood-like footage of the attacks 
together with the shock it caused once more brought to mind the classical concept 
of the sublime (Kearney, 2003; Silverman, 2002; Bleiker and Leet, 2006). My con-
cern here is to construe how the classical sublime has been appropriated in critical 
discourse with respect to the mediation of this specific incident.
Today the media keeps us in touch with the farthest corners of the world 
especially in an encounter with such terrorist acts or big catastrophic events. 
I believe that due to their moral and political significance the mediation of disaster 
news described as the sublime generates a cosmopolitan feeling which is practiced 
momentarily by spectators through the broadcasting of the images of the events. 
The extensive connectivity presented by the media provides the empirical support 
for Kant’s 18th-century remark that the world entered into a universal community 
and a violation of rights is felt in the farthest corners of the world. Today it has 
been carried further since a violation of human rights might be witnessed by people 
from all around the world almost simultaneously via live broadcast. In contemporary 
spectatorship, during the exposure to the scenes of distant suffering, a momentary, 
ephemeral, singular and subjective experience of a cosmopolitan sensibility or feeling 
flourishes in people’s minds. In this paper, I will try to elucidate the nature and the 
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possible role of this passing moment, the trace of this fading experience in relation 
to the contemporary understanding of the sublime. 
Due to the complex structure of the debate around new cosmopolitanism(s)2 in 
contemporary social sciences, it is almost an unattainable task to reach a consensus 
on a single normative principle or a set of principles. Yet, I think, the cosmopolitan 
feeling I address here carries a contemporary opportunity to challenge strictly nor-
mative approaches. The opportunity lies in seeing this cosmopolitan feeling as the 
lost component, the lost moral aspect of the events that are described as sublime.
My contention is that today cosmopolitanism may not be only a normative 
ideal to be achieved in the future. In the contemporary events of a sublime nature, 
the awe and fear caused by excessive violence and atrocity are turned into a tem-
porary feeling of cosmopolitan sensibility. This indicates that a cosmopolitan vision 
which is of an aesthetic nature in Kant’s sense can be registered and addressed as 
an alternative ground for claiming a cosmopolitan solidarity in a non-normative way.
In order to substantiate this claim, the paper firstly discloses the present rela-
tion between Kant’s cosmopolitan vision and the sublime by examining (a) Kantian 
cosmopolitanism in its original version, (b) the Kantian sublime and its transforma-
tion after 1945.
Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism
A fervent defender of human freedom in the age of the Enlightenment, Kant 
was a liberal against any patriarchal government. According to him, political freedom 
evolves from the definition of man and it is definitely a – philosophically – provable 
right of man. He also believes that the idea of the state must not be derived from 
any particular example but from the absolute ideal of living together under rightful 
laws (Kant, 1991, p. 174). The idea of state as an absolute ideal and freedom as an 
innate right emphasize the a priori character of Kant’s approach. Therefore, it would 
not be wrong to say that there is a strong link between his critical philosophy and 
political writings. Indeed, according to Hans Reiss practically, Kant’s political essays 
“grow organically out of his critical philosophy” (1991, p. 3).
In order to have an opinion about Kant’s cosmopolitan vision it is best to 
examine the essays “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”3 
and “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”4, as they are the best-known 
representatives of his cosmopolitan thinking. 
Dating back to 1784, Idea propounds a progressive und erstanding of history 
through nine propositions. In this essay we can clearly notice the aforementioned 
link between his metaphysics and his social and political approach. According to the 
essay, man has peculiar capacities to develop and these natural capacities are closer 
to be fully realized with every future generation. The key to constant improvement 
and realizing this end, i.e., actualizing all innate potentials, lies in achieving a just 
2 The distinction between the old and new cosmopolitanism(s) is grounded on the unique position the latter 
occupies between universalism and pluralism. New cosmopolitanism receives many labels: vernacular cosmopoli-
tanism (Homi Bhabha), discrepant cosmopolitanism (James Clifford), rooted cosmopolitanism (David Hollinger), 
actually existing cosmopolitanism (Bruce Robbins), national cosmopolitanism, and situated cosmopolitanism. 
All these cosmopolitanisms variously discuss the old cosmopolitanism in comparison to the new transnational 
face of the world, which brings up issues of diversity and particularity. A closer look at different kinds of new 
cosmopolitanism shows that the new cosmopolitan thinking does not see diversity as a problem as the old 
universalist approach does. Thus, the common aim is to develop a new cosmopolitan framework in which it 
is possible to cope with the unavoidable diversity of cultures in the experience of living. 
3 Here after Idea.
4 Here after Perpetual Peace.
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civil society because the highest objective in such a civil society would be providing 
its members with the greatest freedom possible in so far as it co-exists with the 
freedom of others. In addition to a civil constitution, the “external relationship” 
with other states is to be achieved by any state. This external relationship evolves 
into a cosmopolitan existence when a respect for the unitary structure of each state 
is obtained. A cosmopolitan existence, which is the ultimate end in international 
relations of the states, also conforms to the moral duty that is imposed on us only 
by practical reason without any external constraint.
The other famous essay of Kant, Perpetual Peace (1795) delineates the possible 
conditions of a perpetual peace among states. According to the essay, unless there 
exists a “secret reservation of the material for a future war”; “standing armies”; 
interference in another state’s affairs; hostility that can shadow a prospective peace; 
and lastly, unless a state claims another state by “inheritance, exchange, purchase 
or gift”, then a perpetual peace can be hoped for (Kant, 1991, p. 93-96).
According to Kant, a state of peace is different from a state of nature, which 
in general involves a risk of war because it lacks order or lawful application. Thus, 
the state of peace should be formally instituted. It follows that the men who ever 
have the slightest possibility of a mutual relationship must be subjected to one of 
the three civil constitutions: Ius civitatis: a constitution which concerns a nation and 
protects the civil rights of the individuals of that nation; Ius gentium: a constitution 
which considers the international right of states in mutual relationship with one 
another; and Ius cosmopoliticum: a constitution which is grounded on the cosmo-
politan right of the citizens of a universal state constituted by both individuals and 
states of the world (Kant, 1991, p. 98-99). 
Kant contends that a federation of states is necessary to achieve perpetual 
peace among states. It is a “particular kind of league, [...] a pacific federation (foe-
dus pacificum)” (Kant, 1991, p. 104). This federation’s primary aim is to preserve 
the freedom of the confederated states while it tries to prevent war. According to 
Kant, “this idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus 
leading to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality” (1991, p. 104).
Kant’s progressive understanding of cosmopolitanism cannot be encapsulated 
in a few lines and surely I cannot do justice to his cosmopolitan vision in this paper. 
Neither I am concerned here with evaluating the success or return of Kant’s thought 
to social sciences. Yet, it is significant to remind the reader that quite a number of 
theorists evaluate, appropriate or deconstruct the Kantian cosmopolitan elements 
in the context of contemporary politics. For the scholars who think that an appro-
priation is possible, all discussions around cosmopolitanism and its Kantian model 
that deals with the new forms of social relations of nations gained currency through 
the United Nations, international courts, the idea and preservation of human rights 
and mechanisms for rendering peace (Fine, 2007, p. 4).5
The reason why I brought up his cosmopolitan thought is that Kant’s pro-
gressive understanding of history with a cosmopolitan end empirically failed in the 
face of WWII. As a result, the progressive thinking of universal reason is destroyed 
and now it is evident that Kant’s belief in perpetual peace as the end of history is 
not valid anymore. However, I think Kant’s mode of cosmopolitan thinking is still 
5 In 1995, the anniversary year of Kant’s essay “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Skecth”, it was a com-
mon view among the majority of scholars that the cosmopolitan ideal was still relevant both in a theoretical 
and practical sense (John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-
Bachmann). For instance, in 1997 Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, in their introductory piece to a group of essays 
they edited – and which were written by the mentioned scholars – write that although the normative aspects of 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism are both challenged and defended, the one thing that many agree is that the modern 
ideal of peace must be positive and cosmopolitan in Kant’s sense (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 1997, p. 6).
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relevant to our time, although his normative cosmopolitan approach is indefen-
sible. Kant wrote in 1795 that “violation of rights in one part of the world is felt 
everywhere” (Kant, 1991, p. 107-108). In the 18th-century world this might have 
sounded like a naive prayer of the philosopher. Yet, interestingly, in contemporary 
times, by means of the mass media, an act of violation of human rights is not only 
felt but also witnessed alive by spectators all around the world. As we will discover 
in the following sections of the present study, the cosmopolitan feeling that Kant 
once addressed now endures in a form that is very different from Kant’s norma-
tive thinking could have ever imagined, but before articulating the nature of this 
feeling, we must introduce the conditions of its occurrence. This brings us to the 
transformation of the classical sublime into a contemporary tool for analyzing po-
litical incidents beginning in the 20th century. Thus, in the following sections, first 
we will revisit Kant’s original rendition of the judgment of the sublime and then 
we will see how world politics has transformed the notion of the sublime into the 
locus of a contemporary kind of cosmopolitan experience.
The Kantian sublime in the 18th century
Kant wrote on the sublime in the context of his famous discussion of aesthetic 
judgment or judgments of taste. Judgments of taste pertaining to the beautiful and 
the sublime in nature constitute the core of Kant’s third Critique, i.e., The Critique 
of the Power of Judgment (1790). According to Kant, an awe-inspiring natural 
grandeur such as scenes of a volcano, a hurricane, or a rising ocean can evoke the 
feeling of the sublime. In a famous passage Kant depicts the scene that leads to 
the sublime as follows:
Bold, overhanging, and, as it were, threatening cliffs, thunder-clouds towering up into 
the heavens, bringing with them fl ashes of lightening and crashes of thunder, volcanoes 
with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the 
boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc., make our capacity 
to resist into an insignifi cant trifl e in comparison to their power (Kant, 2001, p. 144).
At such moments, the massive size of a cliff or the extreme might of a hurricane 
appears as absolutely great or absolutely mighty. Kant categorizes the former under 
the title of the mathematically sublime and the latter under that of the dynamically 
sublime. In Kant’s philosophy, absolute measures belong to the jurisdiction of pure 
reason.6 And reason, as the highest faculty of the mind, is the faculty of ideas7 and 
it always seeks for the representation of absolute totality as a real idea.
In an attempt to present the size of an absolutely great natural grandeur, the 
imagination is bound to progress ad infinitum. Such an operation calls for the Idea 
of infinity. However, as we know, Kant writes the following in The Critique of Pure 
Reason: “By an idea I mean a necessary concept of reason for which no congruent 
6 In the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Kant writes that “pure reason reserves for itself solely the absolute totality 
in the use of the concepts of understanding, and seeks to take the synthetic unity thought in the category up 
to the absolutely unconditioned” (Kant, 1999, p. 371).
7 Kant writes: “By an idea I mean a necessary concept of reason for which no congruent object can be given 
in the senses. Therefore the pure concepts of reason, which we are now examining, are transcendental ideas. 
They are concepts of pure reason; for they consider all experiential cognition as being determined by an abso-
lute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented; rather, they are imposed by the nature of reason 
itself and hence refer necessarily to the entire use of understanding. Finally, they are transcendent and surpass 
the boundary of all experience; hence no object can ever occur in experience that would be adequate to a 
transcendental idea” (1999, p. 371).
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object can be given in the senses.” Furthermore, the ideas of pure reason are “tran-
scendent and surpass the boundary of all experience; hence no object can ever 
occur in experience that would be adequate to a transcendental idea” (Kant, 1999, 
p. 371). Therefore, in the sublime experience the imagination is given an impos-
sible task because the ideas of reason cannot be represented as any other sensible 
object. In accordance with this fact, Kant describes the sublime as follows: “it is an 
object (of nature) the representation of which determines the mind to think of the 
unattainability of nature as a presentation of ideas” (Kant, 2001, p. 151).
How does the sublime experience proceed, then? Knowing that it does not 
have the authority to operate beyond sensibility, the faculty of imagination still strives 
towards its worldly limit trying to represent some object that it cannot represent. 
This causes a state of distress and a feeling of pain with respect to this faculty. 
In such a discomfort, reason comes forward and enables the imagination to extend 
itself (mathematically or dynamically) in order to represent what seems to be unat-
tainable. However, the presentation of an absolute by the imagination would not 
be a positive but only a negative presentation which would not correspond to a 
sensible object. This ordeal of the imagination which is a source of both pain and 
pleasure merits the name negative pleasure, as Kant calls it. In the end, due to this 
double feeling, the subject judges the object as the sublime. 
Kant writes that both the discomfort and extension of power of the imagina-
tion belong to 
a presentation of the subjective purposiveness of our mind in the use of the imagination 
for its supersensible vocation, and compels us to think nature itself in its totality, as 
the presentation of something supersensible, subjectively without being able produce 
this presentation objectively (Kant, 2001, p. 151).
With the help of this supersensible vocation we have the “courage to be able 
to measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence of nature” (Kant, 2001, 
p. 144). According to Kant, this feeling of a supersensible vocation is of a moral 
foundation (Kant, 2001, p. 172). Thus, the sublime entails a feeling of respect which 
arises by “virtue of the dominion which reason exercises over sensibility” (Kant, 2001, 
p. 154). This remark expresses a significant characteristic of the Kantian sublime: 
the relation of it to the moral self of the subject. This relation is what makes the 
sublime a valuable subjective experience. Nature triggers the sublime feeling in the 
subject and in the end of a bitter escapade the subject is relieved and the superior-
ity of reason and the moral self over sensibility is assured. In this sense, the Kantian 
sublime is a two-fold, a bitter-sweet undertaking of the subject which ends in a 
celebration of the ultimate principle of humanity, i.e., reason.
We will soon discover how this two-fold experience is treated in the late-
modern era. However, for the present purposes, it will be useful to discuss the 
Kantian sublime in relation to suffering from nature.
In the vast history of the concept, there is one particular natural disaster that 
is accepted to have influenced the thought on the sublime deeply: the Great Lisbon 
earthquake of 1755. It was a mega thrust earthquake with a range of 8.5-9.0 in mag-
nitude and affected a large area causing the death of thousands of people. It was 
neither the greatest nor one of the greatest earthquakes in measure of destruction in 
world history back then. However, it was a disaster which deeply influenced Europe. 
Furthermore, it is accepted that it led to the emergence of seismology due to endless 
scientific speculations following the disaster (Larsen, 2006; Ray, 2009; Sliwinski, 2009).
Astonished by its might and effects, Kant wrote three separate essays on the 
Lisbon earthquake. According to Larsen (2006), the earthquake influenced Kant so 
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deeply that he did not only leave theological accounts of the notion of infinity but 
also changed his value system. In these three essays, he tried to explain the disaster 
scientifically rather than supernaturally (2006, p. 362).8 Abandoning all reference 
to providence, Kant stripped man’s freedom off divine intervention and redesigned 
it as limited only by incomprehensible nature. 
The notions of the sublime and the free human subject who exercises his 
power in the face of enigmatic and incomprehensible nature might have well be 
grounded on the profound effects of the earthquake on the philosopher (Larsen, 
2006, p. 365). Still, it is significant to note that Kant never described the Lisbon 
earthquake as sublime later in his third Critique. This attitude shows that Kant’s 
sublime is never attributed to a natural catastrophe, let alone a social disaster, 
even if it is mighty enough to erase cities from the map. One possible explana-
tion for this is that perhaps Kant saw the earthquake as more of a destructive 
moment than a simple trigger of a feeling. The might of it was so destructive 
that, for the unfortunate people who witnessed the event, it was a complete 
defeat against nature. To put it in another way, it was an experience of pure 
terror for the victims. When the news of distant suffering reached other parts 
of the world, the immediate effect was a great shock to the human imagina-
tionSharon Sliwinski suggests that the Great Lisbon earthquake is the disaster 
that “marks one of the first instances in which subjects became spectators faced 
with the ethical and political implications regarding distant suffering” in Europe 
and “the circulation of eyewitness reports and images appears to have produced 
an intense affective climate that provided fertile ground for the notion of a 
singular humanity” (2009, p. 31). Kant seems to have overlooked these social 
consequences, since he was so engaged with the possible scientific explanation 
for the debacle and its future prevention. This particular disaster carried his 
thoughts from the idea of God to a potent incommensurable nature. However, 
he never wrote on the social aspect of the disaster and never explicitly linked it 
to his notion of the sublime.
Therefore, distant suffering was never an issue in Kant and obviously he did 
not consider the possible effects of this phenomenon in detail. Yet, in this century, 
the idea of cosmopolitanism has a critical dimension for the cases of distant suf-
fering caused by nature or social disasters. We already know that cosmopolitanism 
has been seen as an ideal for centuries and it has recently been criticized widely for 
not having an empirical value or due to its assumption that the real world strictly 
operates according to universal principles of human rights. While the discussions 
persisted, not surprisingly, after WWII, the empirical hope for the ideal has completely 
faded out. Together with the ideal of humanity, the cosmopolitan ideal was severely 
damaged. Living on the same world or carrying the “essence” of humanity did not 
help us recover from the traumatic effects of the war. Parallel to a loss of faith in a 
progressive history, universalistic frameworks for interpreting the horrifying events 
left their place to some radical approaches. The most important one for the pres-
ent purposes is the application of the Kantian sublime in critical scholarship with 
respect to the broadcasted face of the war. This at the same time marks the return 
of the Kantian sublime in such a fashion that it may never carry merely aesthetic 
implications any more.9
8 Larsen writes that “the speculative methods and sarcastic rebuffs of the logical deficiencies in the arguments 
of other scholars have disappeared in favour of meticulous reports on empirical details of the widespread effects 
of the disaster across the continent together with cautious suggestions of causal explanations” (2006, p. 362).
9 In this paper I concentrate on the sublime nature of distant disasters. Yet, the possible political value or poten-
tial of the Kantian sublime has been discussed by many scholars in social sciences from the late 90s onwards. 
For the relevant discussions see, Readings (1992); O’Gorman (2006); LaCapra (2010).
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The sublime in the 20th century
WWII invalidated the assumption that by the authority of universal reason 
there exist universal political norms that provide the well-being of all peoples in 
the world. The ideal of humanity, respect for civil rights, and inherent dignity of 
humanity were all negated first by the news of the Holocaust and then Hiroshima 
towards the end of the war. 
After the Holocaust became known to the world, the shock was colossal. The 
chain of events was contrary to all kinds of humanistic ideals or the authority of 
sound reason. It marked the epic failure of reason and universal thinking. Hence, to 
represent or even to speak of the event required a new set of criteria or concepts. 
At the end of the war, Hiroshima hit the human imagination deeply once more 
as the other incomprehensible disaster the war had generated. After the Holocaust, 
the destruction caused by the atomic bomb Little Boy represented the other event 
that changed the conception of extreme violence in modern history. According to 
Gene Ray, even if these two events are not identical or equivalent crimes, there is 
a “persistent linkage between the two names [that does] imply a shared political 
and ethical failure, as well as a common legacy of diminished human dignity and 
increased insecurity that all latecomers will have to bear” (2005, p. 21). Not surpris-
ingly, after almost seventy years, the effects of these events still linger and people 
are still trying to contemplate the unimaginable.
In modern times the disappointment that these events cause on the human 
imagination is best described by Adorno’s words on Auschwitz:
Cultural criticism fi nds itself faced with the fi nal stage of the dialectic of culture and 
barbarism. To write poetry after the holocaust is barbaric. And this corrodes even the 
knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. Absolute reifi cation, 
which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to 
absorb the mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long 
as it confi nes itself to self-satisfi ed contemplation (1983, p. 34). 
Adorno also condemns the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. And in a radio talk he states that “one cannot dismiss the thought that 
the invention of the atomic bomb, which can obliterate hundreds of thousands of 
people literally in one blow, belongs to the same historical context as genocide” 
(Adorno, in Ray, 2005, p. 21).
Lyotard is another influential mind whose interpretation of Auschwitz is also 
razor-sharp as he writes: “The historian asks: What is human? What impossible? 
The question we must answer is: Do these words still have a meaning? Shouldn’t 
we believe the inhumanity reported by the testimonies of Auschwitz?” (1988, 
p. 18). He refuses all possible narrative representations of the event and states that 
the name Auschwitz is surrounded by a silence, a silence that implies a différend, 
a wrong (tort) which by its nature cannot be put into words or cannot be attained 
other than through a feeling (1988, p. 56). According to Kearney (2001, p. 494), 
Lyotard’s interpretation carries Adorno’s dictum a step further as the philosopher 
demands silence for the representation of the incommensurable, unspeakable, 
unimaginable terror revealed in Auschwitz. 
Describing Auschwitz or Hiroshima as sublime in the strict Kantian sense 
would be a misinterpretation because the incidents did not carry any positive tran-
scendental goal for the moral self of the subject as Kant’s sublime promises. Yet, 
in the above remarks of these two thinkers, the preliminary alterations in the late 
modern notion of the sublime could be noticed. The impossibility to comprehend 
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and speak of Auschwitz was the most challenging state for reason. In the encounter 
with the horrific images of the war, the shock and the helpless state of the human 
imagination assigned a radical limit to the faculties of the imagination and judg-
ment with respect to violence inflicted by humans. In attempts to express the effects 
of the event on the human imagination, the notion of the sublime in its Kantian 
rendition supplied a theoretical ground to address that which cannot be conveyed 
by classical representation. 
In its classical version, Kant’s sublime entails a negative presentation which 
is neither a representation of a sensible nor the representation of nothingness. 
According to Kant, the sublime “must in every case have reference to our way of 
thinking” and the mode of presentation in it can only be negative with respect to 
the sensible. The presentation of the infinite that the imagination desires in accor-
dance with its wish, i.e., “thrusting aside of the sensible barriers” could merely be 
a negative presentation (Kant, 2001, p. 156). Therefore, if we are to talk about a 
representation in the sublime experience, it would not mean indicating or exposing 
an object of representation but merely addressing the existence of something that 
cannot be positively represented. 
The delicate representation of Auschwitz is thought in this way both by Adorno 
and Lyotard. According to Gene Ray, Adorno favored the Kantian sublime in terms 
of the negative presentation it offers because:
For Adorno, [this] method of evoking without invoking, consistent with the traditional 
Jewish ban on images [...] would be central to his theorization of an “after Auschwitz” 
ethic of representation. It is thus one fi gure of thought in which he links, albeit indi-
rectly, Auschwitz and the sublime (Ray, 2005, p. 22).
For Lyotard, the negative presentation of Kant’s sublime suggested the fact 
that there is something that cannot be presented. According to Lyotard, “the si-
lence that surrounds the phrase Auschwitz was the extermination camp is not a 
state of the mind, it is the sign that something remains to be phrased which is not, 
something which is not determined” (1988, p. 57). Thus, for Lyotard, the fact “that 
there is an unpresentable” can only be presented “negatively” (Ray, 2005, p. 22).
In the particular example of Auschwitz, we can detect significant deviations 
of the late-modern sublime from the classical sublime. Firstly, the trigger of the 
sublime feeling is altered. It turns out that in the 20th century the “traumatic power 
and the violence of social forces displace nature as the site and trigger of the sub-
lime” (Ray, 2009, p. 139). Therefore, it lacks the complementary part of the classical 
sublime that offers the reassurance of the power of human reason and a feeling of 
pleasure. The feeling of absolute terror strips off the pleasure principle. Secondly, 
the beholder in the classical Kantian sublime now corresponds to the spectators of 
distant disasters whose experience is indirect or mediated. Victims simply do not 
have the position to cherish their own capacities over nature like in the earlier ver-
sion of the experience of the sublime. Due to the immense damage caused by social 
disasters, they usually suffer from a lethal impact as real witnesses. Therefore, the 
spectator is the only witness whose imagination is struck by the mediated images 
of the violence and terror released by the sublime event.
In his discussion of Auschwitz, Lyotard takes up the difficult example of the 
victim who cannot offer the evidence of people put into the gas chamber because 
there is no eyewitness who is not dead and victim at the same time (1988, p. 12). 
It also marks the shift from eye witness/victim to witness/spectator. The specta-
tors of this event who see the images of the camps as the evidence of extreme 
violence are as safe as Kant’s subject is in the encounter with nature that will 
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lead to a judgment of the sublime. Kant writes in the third Critique that a lethal 
fear cannot be a source for the sublime feeling because “it is impossible to find 
satisfaction in a terror that is seriously intended” (Kant, 2001, p. 144). Following 
this, it is evident that what we mean by the sublime in social disasters does not 
correspond to the lethal terror that the victims suffered. Nor does the thrill of the 
spectator culminate in a negative pleasure. In the 20th-century sublime experience 
“the terror of the sublime becomes permanent ghastly latency, compounded by 
the anguish of shame” (Ray, 2005, p. 5). In this sense the sublime can only be a 
theoretical frame which can at best sympathize with the shock of the imagina-
tion in the encounter of such violence. Lyotard gives an account of this particular 
inability through the following example: 
Suppose that an earthquake destroys not only lives, buildings, and objects but also the 
instruments used to measure earthquakes directly and indirectly. The impossibility of 
quantitatively measuring it does not prohibit, but rather inspires in the minds of the 
survivors the idea of a very great seismic force. The scholar claims to know nothing 
about it, but the common person has a complex feeling, the one aroused by the 
negative presentation of the indeterminate (1988, p. 56-57).
This “complex feeling” is what constitutes the nub of Lyotard’s argument. 
I think in contemporary times this feeling corresponds to the power which transforms 
the spectators into cosmopolitan agents who, as the spectator of the mediated 
experience of social disasters, are eager to respond in cosmopolitan terms. 
More recently, in the field of international relations, the sublime is applied 
as a framework to interpret international terror attacks. Amongst the unfortunate 
events generated by contemporary global politics the one that held the title “sub-
lime” is the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. It is not 
the only instance of international terrorism but it is reported as the biggest in death 
toll among recent attacks. Furthermore, the range of the shock is amplified by the 
fact that the attack was performed against the country with the most formidable 
intelligence services. The news of the attack had a broad repercussion in the press. 
Images of the collapse of the Twin Towers left the world struck with consternation. 
In the endless debates around the event, it is regarded as an instance of terror which 
has an effect on the imagination much like the Kantian sublime (Bleiker and Leet, 
2006; Kearney, 2003; Ray, 2009; Silverman, 2002). 
As indicated above, the late-modern sublime does not entail a verification of 
universal reason or a feeling of pleasure. However, in the particular example of the 
9/11, interestingly, the shock and awe that Americans endured was channeled by 
the Bush administration into a war against terrorism all around the world. In other 
words, as Bleiker and Leet rightly put it, “the experience of dislocation wrought by 
the sublime is countered immediately with heroic and masculine understandings of 
the political, which seek to mobilise the unleashed energy for projects of mastery 
and control” (Bleiker and Leet, 2006, p. 714). 
In most of the cases of international terrorist attacks, spectators are almost the 
only witnesses who can register distant suffering. This brings us to the third devia-
tion from the classical sublime. Now, the terror the victims suffered is experienced 
through mediated images staged by live broadcasts. It is such that the spectatorship 
of such events is inherent in today’s sublime feeling. This recognition corresponds 
to the significant role of the media in the discussions of the contemporary sublime. 
Furthermore, in relation to the sublime experience and distant suffering, the media 
appears to promote a contemporary kind of cosmopolitan experience. Let us now 
turn to the analytics of this experience.
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Distant suffering, the sublime and the 
cosmopolitan ideal in the 21st century
In today’s world a late-modern subject can notice two significant facts. Firstly, 
international politics is defined as almost a locus that produces awe and fear and 
it is seen as the very nature of global politics (Bleiker and Leet, 2006). Secondly, the 
contemporary world is defined by transnational experiences in all fields, and the 
media is held responsible for the mobility of transnational information all around 
the world. The late-modern sublime that I try to indicate in the present paper 
emerges at the intersection of these two conditions. The most apt example for the 
late-modern sublime, then, is the bombing of the World Trade Center on September 
11, 2001. On that day, images of the collapsing Twin Towers left the world struck 
with consternation. Nearly 3,000 people died and, not surprisingly, the news of the 
attack had a broad repercussion in the worldwide media. 
Due to “a very explicit aesthetic dimension” (Bleiker and Leet, 2006, p. 717) 
and a shocking effect on our imagination, the attacks are regarded as “quintes-
sentially sublime” (Silverman, 2002, p. 1) though it is not wrong to hesitate for a 
moment before calling the event the sublime due to “the hideous nature of pain 
and loss involved” (Kearney, 2003, p. 41).
In the particular example of the 9/11 attacks the late-modern sublime deviates 
from both the classical Kantian sublime and the sublime aspects of the Holocaust 
and Hiroshima at least in one crucial aspect. Only after three minutes of the first 
plane crash against the North Tower of the World Trade Center, the moments of 
terror was broadcast live worldwide on TV. This caused a bizarre kind of shared 
experience of disaster and, not surprisingly, blurred the distinction between direct 
witness and spectator. This particular example of mediation of the 9/11 attacks 
altered the existing state of news of distant suffering that was usually performed 
following the event. In the televised experience of the 9/11, the spectatorship is 
so embedded in the event that the 9/11 attacks cannot be thought without the 
fact of its being “televised instantaneously around the world” (Bleiker and Leet, 
2006, p. 715). The media carried moments of real terror simultaneously into our 
homes while we remained “the spectators at a safe distance”. According to Kearney 
(2003, p. 41), this kind of televised experience generated a feeling of “suffering 
‘as if’ [spectators] were present to the terror” and he defines this both as “modern 
America’s first traumatic experience of alien Terror on its own soil” and as a feeling 
of “detachment by virtue of their real absence from the scene itself (as when Bush 
said to Congress, ‘We are a Nation awakened to danger’)”.
The possible relation of the Kantian cosmopolitanism and the sublime that I 
try to address here is grounded in this mentioned alteration in the state of spectator-
ship. Recall that Kant’s cosmopolitan vision presupposed as early as the 18th century 
that we have entered a universal community and a violation of rights can be felt 
in the farthest corners of the world. I think Kant’s foresighted remark is empirically 
validated in the mediation of the news of the attacks on the Twin Towers. Kant never 
writes about the nature of this feeling but I believe that now in the very example 
of this unfortunate event we have a chance to scrutinize the cosmopolitan feeling 
that Kant once addressed. Moreover, surprisingly this feeling is engaged with the 
philosopher’s understanding of the sublime. 
Describing the 9/11 attacks as the sublime certainly suggests that the world’s 
experience of the event is aesthetic rather than cognitive or logical. The first reaction 
of the world was not logical, either. The media, gone mad by the possible repercus-
sions of the attack, took over the reality of the incident and transformed it into a 
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media event. Following the 9/11 attacks, people who turned on their television in 
order to get timely factual information saw a ghastly sequence and replay of the 
images of blasting planes, collapsing of the two giant towers or unfortunate victims 
jumping one by one to their death to escape the flames. I believe that between the 
first and almost simultaneous experience of the attacks and the rerun of horrific 
images over and over again, a cosmopolitan feeling is evoked. It is similar to what 
Kant meant when he wrote that a violation of rights is felt in the far away corners 
of the world. I think we can see this cosmopolitan attitude in the registered im-
mediate reaction of spectators which is usually accompanied by collective grief and 
commemoration of the victims.10
To substantiate this claim I would like to draw upon Lillie Chouliaraki’s The 
Spectatorship of Suffering.11 Chouliaraki observes different attitudes in the news 
text in relation to both the portrayal of the sufferer and the narration of the suffer-
ing on screen. She proposes a hierarchy of disaster news as adventure, emergency 
and ecstatic news. As to their relation to a cosmopolitan attitude, each type of 
news indicates different levels of global relations of power. Among these, ecstatic 
news presents us a truly historic time by unfolding the event moment by moment. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes a demand for action in the relationship between the 
spectator and the victims and, thus, causes an immediate cosmopolitan sensibility 
(Chouliaraki, 2008, p. 377). Chouliaraki offers the mediation of the 9/11 attacks as 
a typical example of ecstatic news due to the undecidable character of the attacks. 
According to her, their undecidability follows from “a dialectic of openness and 
closure, a dialectic with space and time dimensions. In terms of space, the event is 
mediated simultaneously as a local tragedy and as a global political fact. In terms of 
time, the event is mediated simultaneously as contingent, as news, and as making 
history” (Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 158). 
Chouliaraki’s example of an eight-minute shot of the Manhattan skyline burn-
ing exposes the mechanism of the mediation of the images as the sublime. She 
describes the aesthetic quality of the scene as a tableau vivant. According to her,
The camera’s gaze centers on the fumes covering the city and, simultaneously, cou-
ples two image themes – the grey sky and the clear turquoise seawater. In aesthetic 
terms, the camera couples the horror and awe of the sublime with the domesticity 
and friendliness of the beautiful (Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 173). 
According to Chouliaraki, considering the analytics of the mediation of ec-
static news brings us to the fact that the time in the mediation of the events such 
as the 9/11 corresponds to what Heidegger calls ecstatic temporality. According 
to Heidegger, in order to know something, say a sensible event, one must go out 
of the event as a requisite for finite knowledge. Such an act of knowing is at the 
same time a constant ‘standing-out-from’ the event. This is what Heidegger calls 
ecstasis. Relying on this, we can say that the ecstatic character of the mediation of 
disaster news indicates both a going-out and standing-out-from the broadcast event. 
10 There are basically two sides that evaluate the possible effects of the media on cosmopolitan thinking. The 
optimist approach claims that as globally broadcast events, distant disasters gather nations around empathy 
or pity towards the victims. This basically shows the potential of the media in cultivating a cosmopolitan 
sensibility (Thompson, 1995; Tomlinson, 1999). The pessimists, on the contrary, accuse the media and in 
particular television of distancing spectators morally from the sufferers (Habermas, 1989; Robins, 1994). 
See Thompson (1995); Tomlinson (1999); Habermas (1989); Robins (1994).
11 Surely, my selected example of Chouliaraki’s approach of ecstatic news does not capture the full dynamic 
or all sides of the mediation. Nor I intend to consider a detailed account of it. For the sake of a philosophical 
enquiry of the cosmopolitan feeling that I plan to expand, here I restricted my account to the sublime aspect 
of the mediation of the 9/11 as ecstatic news.
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In the relation of the media to the disasters, this distancing or spacing addresses 
the inevitable loss of the presence of the event itself.
What Heidegger’s concept of ecstasy implies is that mediation only provides 
a horizon without fixing knowledge. In Heidegger’s words, as the condition of 
finite knowledge, the “standing-out-from [...], precisely in the standing, forms and 
therein holds before itself—a horizon” (Heidegger, 1990, p. 84). This implies that 
no fixed framework can be decided for what will be the spectator’s response to 
the spectacles of suffering, before any account of the diversity of local media and 
manifold cultural contexts in which such spectacles or images are received. 
Chouliaraki admits that the sublime would also lead to a denunciation of 
suffering. Yet she still contends that the sublime with its aesthetic aspect moralizes 
the spectator. Moralization is achieved through symbolic meaning. Two strategic 
inversions constitute the core of the moralization of the spectator: an inversion in 
time (anachronism) and an inversion in space (anatopism). With an inversion in time, 
a past reference is produced. In the case of the 9/11, the suffering in Pearl Harbor 
is linked to the attacks in an “eternal flow of history”. With the inversion of space, 
separate locations are equalized and a close proximity is enabled. Thus, with both 
an anachronistic and anatopic structure, the sublime “construes a moral horizon” 
(Chouliaraki, 2006, p. 174).
The cosmopolitan thinking that I would like to address is generated by this 
moral horizon in the mediation of suffering. It requires to be defined as an aesthetic 
experience, since it follows from the sublime as its moral component. Therefore, 
the cosmopolitan feeling here is not intellectual or rational as in Kant’s reason-
based cosmopolitan view. It is of a different kind, an aesthetic kind. In this sense, 
the aesthetic experience I address here also differs from the discussions of existing 
cosmopolitanism(s) that seek for normative principles. 
In order to analyze cosmopolitanism as an aesthetic feeling similar to the 
sublime, I would like to take recourse to a fundamental distinction between experi-
ence as Erlebnis and experience as Erfahrung. Simply put, Erfahrung is an empirical 
or cognitive experience which refers to learning or an abstraction. On the contrary, 
Erlebnis corresponds to life experience. More importantly, while Erfahrung has to do 
with generality and thus, universal thinking, Erlebnis refers to a kind of experience 
that is by its nature individual and singular. Following this distinction, we might 
say that the kind of cosmopolitan experience which is at stake here recalls Erlebnis.
Then, how do we understand the singularity of experience here? What do we 
mean by it? In order to comprehend this, the relation of this experience to the sublime 
nature of the event needs to be emphasized. Jean-Luc Nancy’s understanding of the 
sublime might be of help at this point. In his account of the sublime, Nancy makes 
a distinction between representation and presentation. Representation is a significa-
tion, which requires conformity or agreement. Contrary to this, in presentation what 
is at stake is “the event and the explosion of an appearing and disappearing which, 
considered in themselves, cannot conform to or signify anything” (Nancy, 1993, 
p. 2). What I tried to address in this essay is this kind of explosion of appearing and 
disappearing of a cosmopolitan aesthetic feeling as the complementary part of the 
late-modern sublime. Thus, the core of my argument can be formulated as follows: 
today the self-enjoyment of reason or the self-presentation of the imagination in the 
classical sublime is lost in the encounter with the mediated images of catastrophic 
events that is now accepted to trigger the sublime feeling. There is an attempt to com-
pensate the inhuman (and often also immoral) images through a cosmopolitan feeling 
or ‘(e)motion’, as Nancy might say. This feeling is experienced as a limit experience. 
In the 21st century, it is not the limit of sensibility, as in the classical sublime, 
but that of humanity that is confronted. The spectator-subject, who shares the 
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unimaginable terror through some mediated images at the limit, encounters a 
cosmopolitan horizon instead of the self-enjoyment of reason. In the classical sub-
lime, reason saves the imagination from crisis by recalling the ultimate principle of 
humanity, whereas the very occurrence of the contemporary sublime is triggered 
by a scene of inhuman violence. This time overcoming the distress is not as easy as 
reviewing the mental capacities of man as in Kant’s sublime. And yet, as the dam-
age strikes humanistic thought, reason has to apply to a cosmopolitan feeling that 
would remind us of the idea of living in the same world and, thus, restore the moral 
principle of humanity. Due to the humanistic nature of reason, a cosmopolitan feel-
ing is expected to be felt by any spectator in the encounter with a distant suffering 
in the form of a violation of rights. In other words, this feeling demands to be rep-
resented in some communal sense which would later culminate in a cosmopolitan 
action. However, what Bill Readings wrote about the Kantian sublime applies here 
to this cosmopolitan feeling: it “demands to be shared but it cannot be the object 
of a social representation” (1992, p. 414). It cannot be permanently represented or 
enter into an economy of reproduction because it appears as the complementary, 
moralizing part of an aesthetic (sublime) experience. In other words, it cannot be 
abstracted or rationalized as some rationales. Hence, it is inevitably and merely 
experienced as a horizon at the limit, through the limit. 
Conclusion
In this paper, first I remind that in the 20th century, the sublime feeling in its 
Kantian rendition is used to refer to the feeling that results mostly from immoral 
human acts. Due to this historical fact, the classical sublime has lost the aspect of 
moral feeling which used to complement it. I argued that today, due to the necessarily 
transnational structure of the world, in the convergence of the sublime, its mediation 
and the state of distant suffering, cosmopolitanism is offered as the alternative moral 
feeling that would restore the lost moral aspect of the sublime. I also argued that 
cosmopolitanism as a moral feeling that would partner the contemporary sublime 
is of an aesthetic origin in accordance with the sublime. Moreover, it is an individual 
experience of a spectator-subject and thus cannot be represented positively in a 
normative form. Thus, in the end we cannot claim for this mode of cosmopolitan 
feeling more than what Kant argued for the presentation of the infinite in the clas-
sical sublime: a negative presentation. This implies that cosmopolitanism should not 
be represented as some universal concepts or regulations. It is rather a feeling, an 
attitude, which admits singularity. Lastly, if we are to ask what can be inferred from a 
cosmopolitan aesthetic experience, the answer can be that it creates a cosmopolitan 
spectator whose identification with the images of distant suffering carries a potential 
to be transformed into a cosmopolitan solidarity. In this sense, I believe that the rela-
tion between the sublime as distant suffering and its potential link to cosmopolitan 
thinking that I tried to articulate cannot be exhausted here but, on the contrary, it 
triggers further philosophical and sociological research on the topic.
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